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The causal relationship between educational investments and student outcomes continues
to attract attention. The majority of studies have examined the e®ectiveness of public school
expenditures or private school attendance on student outcomes. This paper contributes to
the literature by examining the e®ectiveness of an unexplored dimension of educational
inputs|private tutoring expenditures of South Korean parents. In the face of di±culties
in causal estimation, the paper employs a nonparametric bounding method that is recently
gaining popularity. With the method we show that the true e®ect of private tutoring remains
at most modest. The tightest bounds suggest that a 10 percent increase in expenditure raises
a student's test score by 0.764 percent at the largest. Such a modest e®ect remains similar
across male and female students, and across students of di®erent ability levels.
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to attract attention. The majority of studies have examined the e®ectiveness of public school
expenditures or private school attendance on student outcomes. This paper contributes to
the literature by examining the e®ectiveness of an unexplored dimension of educational
inputs|private tutoring expenditures of South Korean parents. In the face of di±culties
in causal estimation, the paper employs a nonparametric bounding method that is recently
gaining popularity. With the method we show that the true e®ect of private tutoring remains
at most modest. The tightest bounds suggest that a 10 percent increase in expenditure raises
a student's test score by 0.764 percent at the largest. Such a modest e®ect remains similar
across male and female students, and across students of di®erent ability levels.
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1 Introduction
The causal relationship between educational investments and student outcomes continues to
attract attention. Despite decades of intensive study, however, there is no general consensus
regarding the e®ectiveness of monetary educational inputs for student outcomes. Card and
Krueger (1996), Greenwald et al. (1996) and Krueger (2003) present evidence for the e®ectiveness
of public school expenditures. In contrast, Betts (1996) and Hanushek (1986, 1997, 2003)
cast doubt on the conclusion of these researchers and suggest several factors that can explain
discrepancies in conclusion (e.g., Betts, 1996). Studies focusing on private schools (e.g., Catholic
schools) do not shed much light on the impacts of educational investments as well. While Evans
and Schwab (1995) and Neal (1997) show educational bene¯ts of attending Catholic high school,
Altonji et al. (2005), Figlio and Stone (1999) and Goldhaber (1996) ¯nd no signi¯cant gaps in
test scores between public and private schools.
Given such a lack of consensus about the e®ectiveness of educational investments for out-
puts, this paper aims to contribute to the literature by examining the e®ect of an unexplored
dimension of educational inputs|expenditures on private tutoring that is widely employed by
1South Korean parents in order to supplement public school education. It is well known that in
South Korea parents spend a great deal of money on private tutoring of academic subjects such
as math and English for their children1; the prevalence of private tutoring is largely in response
to a rigid system of public secondary education.2 Given the large amount of expenditures on
private tutoring, many including parents as well as educational policy makers are concerned
about its e®ectiveness for student academic performance. From a broader perspective, an ex-
amination into the e®ect of private tutoring serves to illuminate the debates on the impacts of
educational investments on student outcomes.
It is well known that educational expenditures on a student are not exogenously and ran-
domly determined; there is little doubt that private tutoring expenditures are endogenous and
correlated with a student's personal, family and academic characteristics. In the absence of
a randomized experiment on private tutoring, a causal estimation in principle calls for an in-
strumental variable (IV) that is strongly related with the expenditures but exogenous to the
determinants of academic performance. However, it seems extremely di±cult to ¯nd such an
exogenous variable. Kang (2007) estimates the e®ect of private tutoring expenditures by em-
ploying birth order (i.e., a ¯rst-born indicator) as an IV for the expenditures. But he admits
that such an IV may produce the biased estimates that will probably overstate the true e®ect
of private tutoring.
In the face of such di±culties, the current paper extends Kang's (2007) study of private
tutoring by employing an alternative strategy that is recently gaining popularity in empirical
analysis|a nonparametric bounding method. Nonparametric bounds analysis was ¯rst intro-
duced in economics by Manski (1990) and further developed in Manski (1997), Manski and
Pepper (2000), and Hotz et al. (1997). Some recent examples of this method include Blundell et
1According to a statistic, South Korean parents spend on private tutoring 85 percent as much as they spend
on public schooling (Korean Educational Development Institute, Survey on Educational Expenditures, 1998).
Ministry of Education (1999, 2000) also shows that private tutoring expenses are about 9 percent of incomes
of the households that have school-aged children for all income groups. At the national level, total household
expenditures on private tutoring of year 2003 amount to 2.3 percent of the national GDP and 55 percent of
the national annual budget for public education (Korean Educational Development Institute, Media Brie¯ng,
November 19, 2003).
2In South Korea, secondary school students have little freedom in the choice of their middle and high schools
in a school district. Since 1969 student allocation to public and private schools has largely been under the strict
control of the government, especially in urban regions (`Leveling Policy'). Within school ability grouping is rarely
implemented due to the government's egalitarian policy on secondary education and parents' objections. Curricula
are also controlled by the Ministry of Education nationwide for the most part. For more detail discussions on
secondary education and private tutoring in South Korea, see Kang (2007, section 3), Kim and Lee (2001) and
OECD (1998).
2al. (2007), Ger¯n and Schellhorn (2006), Gonzalez (2005), Kreider and Pepper (2007), Lechner
(1999), Manski and Nagin (1998), and Pepper (2000) among others.
The basic idea of the nonparametric bounding method is that instead of obtaining point
estimates that often rely on questionable assumptions, one may calculate lower and upper
bounds of the treatment e®ect given a few weaker assumptions. A unique advantage of this
approach in an estimation of the e®ect of private tutoring is that a potential IV does not have
to be fully exogenous. To the extent that the IV is monotonically (either positively or negatively)
related with the outcome variable, the method, in combination of some other assumptions, is
able to draw fairly tight bounds of the causal e®ect (Manski and Pepper 2000). Provided that
the bounds are su±ciently narrow and informative to locate the causal e®ect, we interpret that
the magnitude of the true e®ect is somewhere between the estimated lower and upper bounds.
We apply such a nonparametric bounding method to Kang's (2007) data in order to esti-
mate the e®ect of private tutoring expenditures on college-entrance examination scores of high
school graduates in South Korea. Using a student's ¯rst-born status in the family as a mono-
tone IV (MIV) of Manski and Pepper (2000), the current paper shows that the true e®ect of
private tutoring remains at most modest. The tightest|hence most informative|bounds of
our bounding method suggest that a 10 percent increase in private tutoring expenditure raises
a student's test score by 0 percent at the smallest and by 0.764 percent at the largest. Such a
modest e®ect of private tutoring remains similar across male and female students, on the one
hand, and across students of di®erent ability levels, on the other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical strategy of
the paper. Section 3 discusses the data. Empirical results are shown in section 4. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Framework
Let us ¯rst de¯ne yi as the normalized|with mean zero and variance one|test score of student
i. Let Ti be a treatment indicator that is equal to zero if the average monthly spending for i's
tutoring is equal to zero; one if it is greater than zero but less than or equal to H1; and two if
it is greater than H1.3 Finally, let an indicator Fi be equal to one if i is ¯rst-born in the family
3In empirical analysis below, we set H1 equal to KRW 300,000|approximately US$251. Such a threshold
is, however, arbitrary. As robustness checks, we construct two alternative Ti's by employing KRW 200,000 and
3and zero otherwise.
Each student receives treatment t 2 T = f0;1;2g. The response function yi(¢) : T ! Y
maps treatments into outcomes. The realized outcome yi ´ yi(z) is the level of y for student
i who actually receives treatment z. The latent outcome yi(t) (t 6= z) describes what level
of performance student i would have achieved had he or she received treatment t. Of primary
interest are the causal e®ects of increasing tutoring expenditures on i's test score: E[yi(1)¡yi(0)],
E[yi(2) ¡ yi(1)], and E[yi(2) ¡ yi(0)].
Following Gonzalez (2005), Manski (1990) and Manski and Pepper (2000), in order to set
up bounds for the treatment e®ects, we ¯rst decompose E[y(t)] by
E[y(t)] = E[yjz = t]Pr(z = t) + E[y(t)jz 6= t]Pr(z 6= t) (1)
To make bounds analysis feasible, let us suppose that y is bounded by [K0, K1]. Since the
unobservable counterfactual E[y(t)jz 6= t] is also bounded by [K0, K1], we have the worst-case
(WC) bounds of E[y(t)] given by
E[yjz = t]Pr(z = t) + K0Pr(z 6= t)
· E[y(t)] ·
E[yjz = t]Pr(z = t) + K1Pr(z 6= t)
(2)
In order to further tighten the bounds of E[y(t)], a few assumptions can be invoked below
individually as well as jointly. The ¯rst assumption to be employed is monotone treatment
response (MTR), which is speci¯ed as follows:
tn < tm ¡! y(tn) · y(tm) (3)
This assumption is drawn from a theory that there will be non-negative impacts of increased
educational spending on a student's academic performance. A majority of empirical studies
support the validity of such an assumption. Although the exact magnitude of a positive e®ect
of educational spending on a student's performance is hardly agreed, it is also rare that studies
¯nd strong negative impacts of monetary educational investments (see Hanushek (1997, 2003)).
400,000 as a new threshold between 1 and 2 of Ti. The results based on such thresholds are qualitatively similar
to those reported in the current paper. The alternative results are available upon request.
4Under MTR, the bounds of E[y(t)] can be expressed by
E[yjz · t]Pr(z · t) + K0Pr(z > t)
· E[y(t)] ·
E[yjz ¸ t]Pr(z ¸ t) + K1Pr(z < t)
(4)
The second assumption is monotone treatment selection (MTS), which is speci¯ed by:
tn < tm ¡! E[y(t)jz = tn] · E[y(t)jz = tm] (5)
This assumption supposes that sorting into treatment is not exogenous but monotone in the
sense that the average latent outcome y(t) is greater for those students whose parents spend a
large amount of money on private tutoring (z = tm) than for those whose parents spend a small
amount (z = tn, tn < tm). For instance, high income parents are more likely to spend a large
amount of money on private tutoring for their child than low-income parents, while children of
high income parents tend to be more academically able and smarter than those of low-income
parents (see, e.g., Haveman and Wolfe (1995)). While it speci¯es a source of endogeneity in
a conventional OLS method of examining the impacts of educational investments, the MTS
assumption can make an important contribution to tightening the bounds of the true e®ect in
a bounds analysis.
The MTS assumption yields the bounds of E[y(t)] given by
E[yjz = t]Pr(z ¸ t) + K0Pr(z < t)
· E[y(t)] ·
E[yjz = t]Pr(z · t) + K1Pr(z > t)
(6)
The third assumption is the presence of a monotone instrumental variable (MIV) that is
proposed by Manski and Pepper (2000). While an instrumental variable (IV) À should satisfy
mean-independence (i.e., E[y(t)jÀ = u1] = E[y(t)jÀ = u2]; u1 6= u2), an MIV is assumed to
satisfy the following mean-monotonicity:
u1 < u2 ¡! E[y(t)jÀ = u1] · E[y(t)jÀ = u2] (7)
5Following an idea of Black et al. (2005, p.695) and Kang (2007), we use the ¯rst-born
indicator (Fi) as an MIV for our bounds analysis, where Fi is a dummy variable that takes 1
if i is a ¯rst-born child in the family and 0 otherwise. The MIV assumption supposes that,
given a certain level of tutoring expenditure, ¯rst-born students (Fi = 1) on average performs
as well or better than students who are not ¯rst-born (i.e., later-born) in the family (Fi =
0). There are at least two reasons why such an assumption is valid in our current context.
First, although there are studies showing little impact of birth order on a child's intelligence
(Retherford and Sewell 1991, Rodgers et al. 2000), studies that report strong, if any, birth order
e®ects usually show negative rather than positive e®ects of birth order on intelligence (Bjerkedal
et al. 2007, Black et al. 2007, Zajonc 1976, Zajonc and Mullally 1997). Namely, intelligence of
older siblings is either as high or higher than that of younger siblings. It is a well-established
empirical regularity that a child's high intelligence leads to high academic performance in school
(Herrnstein and Murray 1994). Second, previous empirical studies show that parents favor the
¯rst-born relative to the later-born with respect to educational investments in general (Behrman
and Taubman 1986, Black et al. 2005). Our results, which will be presented in Table 2, also
show that parents spend more on private tutoring for the ¯rst-born than for the later-born. To
the extent that parents favor the ¯rst-born with respect to monetary educational investments,
they will tend to support the same child more over other educational dimensions as well, say,
by providing better emotional and non-¯nancial supports for the ¯rst-born.4 Such supports can
lead to better performance of the ¯rst-born independently of monetary investments.
To the extent that the MIV assumption is valid in our framework, it yields the bounds of
4In our data set discussed shortly, there are not many variables available by which we can examine such
unobservable supports of parents for a certain-parity child. Nevertheless, we attempt an indirect method to
address how di®erently parents treat a ¯rst-born child relative to other siblings by focusing on early childhood.
Using the information on how often parents read books to a child in pre-school period (1 if very often and
0 otherwise) and how often they help the child's homework and examination in elementary school period (1
if very often or often and 0 otherwise), we run linear probability models in which the student's personal and
family backgrounds are controlled for together with the ¯rst-born indicator. The results show that parents more
often read to a ¯rst-born child in pre-school period (coe±cient 0.125; SE 0.027), and help the ¯rst-born child's
homework and examination in elementary school period (coe±cient 0.073; SE 0.029). In addition, parents have
greater educational aspiration for a ¯rst-born child (a post-graduate degree as opposed to a university degree or
below) than for other siblings (coe±cient 0.052; SE 0.026).
6E[y(t)] that are expressed by
P
u2F Pr(F = u)
©




u2F Pr(F = u)finfu2¸u[E(yjF = u2;z = t)Pr(z = tjF = u2) + K1Pr(z 6= tjF = u2)]g
(8)
Given each of the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions, we can impose multiple assumptions
jointly in order to further tighten the bounds of E[y(t)] and those of treatment e®ects E[y(tm)]¡
E[y(tn)] (tn < tm). We below experiment with all possible combinations of the individual
assumptions: MIV+MTR, MIV+MTS, MTR+MTS, and MIV+MTR+MTS.
Under MIV+MTR, the bounds of E[y(t)] are given by
P
u2F Pr(F = u)
©




u2F Pr(F = u)finfu2¸u[E(yjF = u2;z ¸ t)Pr(z ¸ tjF = u2) + K1Pr(z < tjF = u2)]g
(9)
Under MIV+MTS, the bounds of E[y(t)] are given by
P
u2F Pr(F = u)
©




u2F Pr(F = u)finfu2¸u[E(yjF = u2;z = t)Pr(z · tjF = u2) + K1Pr(z > tjF = u2)]g
(10)
Under MTR+MTS, the bounds of E[y(t)] are given by
P
h<t E(yjz = h)Pr(z = h) + E(yjz = t)Pr(z ¸ t)
· E[y(t)] ·
P
h>t E(yjz = h)Pr(z = h) + E(yjz = t)Pr(z · t)
(11)
7Finally, under MIV+MTR+MTS, the bounds of E[y(t)] are given by
P












h>t E(yjF = u2;z = h)Pr(z = hjF = u2) + E(yjF = u2;z = t)Pr(z · tjF = u2)]
ª
(12)
Given the bounds of E[y(t)] under varying assumptions, the lower bound (LB) of average
treatment e®ects (ATE), E[y(tm) ¡ y(tn)] (tm > tn), is calculated by the di®erence between
the lower bound of E[y(tm)] and the upper bound of E[y(tn)]; the upper bound (UB) of ATE
is obtained by the di®erence between the upper bound of E[y(tm)] and the lower bound of
E[y(tn)]. Along with the bounds of E[y(t)] and ATEs are calculated bootstrap 5th and 95th
percentiles of the lower and upper bound, respectively. The interval between these percentiles
shows a conservative 90% con¯dence interval for the estimated bounds. The number of the
bootstrap samples is 200.
3 Data
3.1 Description of the Main Sample
For empirical analysis the current study employs the Korean Education and Employment Panel
(KEEP).5 KEEP is an annual longitudinal study that is conducted from year 2004 onward by
the Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training (KRIVET)|a government-
funded research institute. The basic structure of KEEP follows the National Educational Lon-
gitudinal Studies (NELS) of the U.S. The beginning cohorts of KEEP consist of 6,000 students
from three di®erent populations: 2,000 students each from middle school (grade 9), general high
school and vocational high school (both grade 12, the ¯nal year of secondary education).
An important feature of the KEEP data is that the survey collects detailed information on
a student's private tutoring experience and expenditures, and the sibling composition from the
parent questionnaire. It enables us to construct main explanatory variables and an (monotone)
instrumental variable of this study. Also unique in the KEEP data is the availability of the
5Kang (2007, section 4) o®ers more detail descriptions of the KEEP data and the sample of the primary
analysis.
8College Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT) scores for high school graduates. CSAT is the national
college-entrance examination of Korea that is annually administered under the supervision of
the Ministry of Education and whose scores are used as an important factor by colleges and
universities to determine the admission of the applicants. Using the resident registration number
of the student, the KEEP data are linked to the administrative data base of the 2004 CSAT
scores for the test writers. As a measure of a student's academic performance, we employ
the raw CSAT scores of the following three subjects: the Korean language, mathematics, and
English. The raw CSAT score of each individual subject ranges from lowest 36 to highest 150;
mean and standard deviation of each score are around 100 and 17, respectively. Given such a
CSAT score of each subject, the simple average of the three individual scores|or two individual
scores if a student chooses to take only two tests|is calculated. This average score is further
normalized to have mean zero and variance one for subsequent analysis.
Although vocational high school graduates are eligible for CSAT, the majority of the CAST
writers are general high school graduates; they are also the majority of students taking private
tutoring. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to the general high-school sample of 2,000 students.
From this sample, we exclude those students whose guardian is not one of the parents, because
patterns of private educational investment and academic performance among these students
may be far from typical due to the absence of both parents. In addition, we exclude students if
they either attend a special high school for music, ¯ne arts and athletics, take private tutoring to
major in these subjects in universities, or both. Tutoring costs among them are generally much
greater than costs of a normal tutoring of academic subjects. And these students are likely to
be poor performers in such a general subject test as CSAT. At last, students are excluded if the
information of key variables used in the analysis is missing. The preceding three restrictions
leave a total of 1,467 students for further analysis. Descriptive statistics of the main sample
and their di®erences between ¯rst-born and later-born students are documented in Table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
In the primary sample the mean CSAT score of the Korean language is 100.9; the mean scores
of math and English are 98.6 and 99.7, respectively. While mean math score is close between
9the two groups, mean scores of Korean and English among ¯rst-borns signi¯cantly exceed those
of later-born students. And the mean of the CSAT scores averaged over the three subjects is
also signi¯cantly greater for ¯rst-born than for later-born students.
As for the amount of spending on private tutoring, ¯rst-born students receive larger edu-
cational investments from their parents than later-born counterparts do.6 While the overall
average monthly spending on private tutoring is about W297,400|approximately $249, the
average spending for ¯rst-born students (W336,800) is 34 percent greater than that for later-
borns (W251,100). This amount of gap is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The proportion of
those who have ever received private tutoring|those with positive monthly spending|is also
far higher among ¯rst-born students (85.4 percent) than among the later-born (73.5 percent).
Using the questionnaire for grade-12 homeroom teachers, we create a measure of a student's
pre-tutoring quality. The teachers are asked to report a student's approximate rank from 0 (low-
est quality) to 100 (highest quality) within a school or a classroom during the second semester
of grade 11.7 According to this measure, students are on average rated to have a medium
quality (44.5 percentile). The later-born have a quality slightly higher than the ¯rst-born. The
di®erence, however, is indistinguishable from zero. Weekly hours of self-study excluding private
tutoring hours are also similar between ¯rst-born (12.4 hours) and later-born students (11.6
hours). The preceding statistics indicate that there seem to exist no substantial di®erences in
student quality and self-investment in study between ¯rst-born and later-born students. Par-
ents, on the other hand, invest more intensively in ¯rst-born than in later-born children.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 OLS and 2SLS Results
An an intermediate step, we estimate the following conventional model for academic e®ects of
educational expenditures by OLS and 2SLS:
yi = ¯0 + Si¯1 + Xi¯2 + ui (13)
6The KEEP survey asks the monthly average amount of overall expenditures on private tutoring during the
last six months before grade 12|roughly nine to fourteen months prior to the CSAT test.
7Because of the traditional leveling policy of Korean government in secondary education, ability mixing is
widely applied in Korean high schools. As a result, a student's rank will not vary substantially, whether an entire
school or a single classroom is employed as a reference group for ranking students.
10where yi is the Z-score of student i that is normalized from the averaged CSAT score (Yi) to
have mean zero and variance one in the entire general high school sample; Si is the level of a
monthly spending on tutoring for i; Xi is the vector of i's personal and family backgrounds
as well as school characteristics; and ui is the random error term. For 2SLS estimation, Fi is
employed as an IV for Si.
Table 2 presents the OLS and 2SLS estimation results. In the square bracket under each
of OLS and 2SLS estimates is reported a percentage change in test score due to a 10 percent
increase in tutoring expenditure, which is evaluated at the mean values of the average test score
(99.64) and expenditure (297.4).
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE.
The OLS estimate for the e®ect of private tutoring expenditures in column (1) suggests that
the association between the tutoring expenditure and normalized test score is positive but quite
small and signi¯cantly indistinguishable from zero. A W10,000 greater monthly expenditure
on private tutoring is related to no more than a 0.001 SD higher test score. Such magnitude
implies that a 10 percent greater expenditure is related to only a 0.06 percent higher test
score. As explained previously, however, such an association may not be consistent and causal.
Depending on the correlation between Si and ui, the OLS estimate may be biased either upward
or downward.
The ¯rst-stage results of the 2SLS regression of tutoring expenditures on IV and explanatory
variables are presented in column (2). Being ¯rst-born signi¯cantly and positively a®ects private
tutoring expenditures for a student. First-born students receive on average W47,620 greater
expenditures on tutoring than later-born students. Such an amount is signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero. Thus to the extent that Fi is fully exogenous, it can serve as an IV for Si in a 2SLS
estimation.8
The 2SLS estimate of the e®ect of tutoring expenditures is shown in column (3). It suggests
that a W10,000 increase in expenditure enhances a student's performance by 0.02 SD. Evaluated
8Although the coe±cient for Fi is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in the regression setting, Fi fails to be a
strong IV for tutoring expenditures for the student (F-statistic is 7.26), according to a criterion of Stock et al.
(2002). Hence we apply testing methods that are robust to the presence of weak IVs (Stock et al. 2002). At
the bottom of column (3) of Table 2, we report the 95 percent con¯dence intervals for ¯1 that are based on test
statistics of the Anderson-Rubin (AR) test (Anderson and Rubin 1949), the Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test
(Kleibergen 2002), and the Conditional Likelihood Ratio (CLR) test (Moreira 2003).
11at the mean values of the test score and expenditure, the estimate implies that a 10 percent
increase in expenditure on private tutoring raises test score by 0.76 percent. The estimated
e®ect, however, is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Furthermore, to the extent that
there exists a potentially positive rather than negative correlation between Fi and ui as is
implied by our MIV assumption in (7), our 2SLS estimate is more likely to even overstate the
true e®ect of private tutoring rather than understate it. As explained in the introduction, a
potentially positive correlation between Fi and ui can be better exploited by a nonparametric
bounding method than by a conventional 2SLS method.
4.2 Results of Bounds Analysis
The estimated bounds of E[y(t)] and average treatment e®ects (ATE) for the whole sample
are presented in Table 3. We also present a graphical illustration of the bounds of ATE under
di®erent combinations of the assumptions in Figure 1.
INSERT TABLE 3 AND FIGURE 1 HERE.
In our speci¯cation y is a normalized test score that may in priciple vary from negative
in¯nity to positive in¯nity. In the data, however, y varies from -2.845 to 2.571. In order to
make bounds analysis feasible, we arbitrarily impose lower and upper bounds of y, setting K0
equal to -3 and K1 equal to 3. Alternative values of K0 and K1, however, do not a®ect the
results of the paper substantially.9
Let us ¯rst examine the bounding results for an average treatment e®ect E[y(1) ¡ y(0)],
which we call `ATE10.' We will discuss the results for other ATEs, E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] (`ATE21')
and E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] (`ATE20'), subsequently. The worst-case (WC) bounds of ATE10, which
are generated under no particular assumptions on statistical properties of E[y(t)], suggest that
ATE10 could be anywhere between -3.840 SD and 3.993 SD. Such bounds imply that a 10
percent increase in expenditure may change the test score of the student, who has t = 1 and
mean values of expenditure (183.5) and test score (99.3), by negative 589 percent to positive
613 percent. Although such bounds are not very informative to infer the true e®ect of tutoring
expenditure, they are much narrower than the bounds that range between -6 SD and 6 SD
9This sensitivity analysis is unnecessary for the MTR+MTS and MIV+MTR+MTS bounds, because they are
not a function of K0 and K1. The results based on alternative values of K0 and K1 are available upon request.
12under no assumption whatsoever. The MTR assumption, which supposes non-negative e®ects
of private tutoring, cuts the size of the WC bounds by more than a half, ruling out negative
ATE10 by design. The MTS assumption tightens the WC bounds mainly by lowering the upper
bound of ATE10 to 1.177 SD. However, the MIV assumption by itself fails to narrow the WC
bounds substantially.
If we put the individual assumptions together to further tighten the bounds of ATE10, the
joint MIV+MTR assumption narrows the MIV bounds of ATE10 primarily by raising the lower
bound (LB) to 0; the joint MIV+MTS assumption narrows the MIV bounds by lowering the
upper bound (UB) to 1.162 SD. In addition, the joint MTR+MTS assumption considerably
tightens the bounds of ATE10 to a range between 0 SD and 0.36 SD mainly by ruling out
negative ATE10 under MTS by design. Finally, the joint MIV+MTR+MTS assumption yields
the tightest bounds of ATE10 between 0 SD and 0.345 SD. If one accepts the three assumptions
of MIV, MTR, and MTS jointly to estimate the true e®ect of private tutoring, she can infer
that the true magnitude of the e®ect of private tutoring is somewhere between 0 SD and 0.345
SD, while the expenditure (Si) on average increases from 0 to 183.5.
In order to gain some perspective of our bounding results, in Table 6 we report percentage
increases in test score due to a 10 percent increase in expenditure for ATE10, ATE21 and
ATE20 and for di®erent samples, which are calculated at the mean values of the test score and
expenditure of each sample. To facilitate interpretations and compare results of the bounding
method with the 2SLS estimate in Table 2, it is necessary to note that the mean value of the
tutoring expenditure (Si) is 0 for t = 0, 183.5 for t = 1, and 677.2 for t = 2. Therefore,
S10 ´ b E(Sijt = 1) ¡ b E(Sijt = 0) = 183:5; S21 ´ b E(Sijt = 2) ¡ b E(Sijt = 1) = 493:8; and
S20 ´ b E(Sijt = 2) ¡ b E(Sijt = 0) = 677:2; the mean value of the averaged raw test score (Yi)
is b E(Yijt = 0) = 94:9, b E(Yijt = 1) = 99:3, and b E(Yijt = 2) = 103:3. Using these ¯gures and
estimated bounds of ATEs, one can calculate a percentage change in test score due to a 10
percent increase in expenditure by
10 £
b °mn £ 15:2 £ b E(Sijt = m)
Smn £ b E(Yijt = m)
where 15:2 = 1 SD; b °mn is an estimated bound of ATE, E[y(m)¡y(n)] (m > n; m;n = 0;1;2);
and Yi is the averaged raw CSAT score before normalization.
13INSERT TABLE 6 HERE.
Evaluated at the mean values of the test score (99.3) and expenditure (183.5), the preceding
MIV+MTR+MTS bounds of ATE10 suggest that a 10 percent increase in expenditure on
average raises the test score by at least 0 and at most 0.53 percent. The bootstrap con¯dence
interval for the MIV+MTR+MTS bounds implies that the LB of ATE10 fails to be strictly
greater than zero at the 10 percent signi¯cance level. In addition, the UB of ATE10 rules out
substantial e®ects of private tutoring. Even the 95th percentile of the UB of ATE10 suggests
no more than a 0.69 percent increase in test score due to a 10 percent rise in expenditure.
Therefore, it seems doubtful that there exist strong positive causal impacts of private tutoring
on student academic performance. Even the estimated UB of the MIV+MTR+MTS bounds of
ATE10 is below the size of the e®ect of private tutoring estimated by 2SLS. However, to the
extent that the 2SLS estimate in Table 2 is likely to overstate the true e®ect of private tutoring,
our bounding results are not incompatible with the 2SLS result.
Next, if we examine an ATE E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] (`ATE21'), the primary results and patterns of
changes in bounds with varying assumptions are largely similar to those of ATE10. The WC
bounds of ATE21 are not very informative in tightening the bounds of ATE, suggesting that
ATE21 could be anywhere between -3.537 SD and 3.669 SD. MTR cuts the size of the WC
bounds by more than a half, ruling out negative ATE21. MTS tightens the WC bounds by
lowering the UB of ATE21 to 0.874 SD. MIV does not lead to tightening the WC bounds. The
joint MIV+MTR assumption tightens the MIV bounds by raising the LB of ATE21 to 0; the
joint MIV+MTS assumption tightens the MIV bounds by lowering the UB to 0.864 SD. The
joint MTR+MTS assumption considerably tightens the bounds of ATE21. Finally, the joint
MIV+MTR+MTS assumption yields the tightest bounds of ATE21 between 0 SD and 0.304
SD. From Table 6, evaluated at the mean values of the test score (103.3) and expenditure (677.2)
for t = 2, the upper MIV+MTR+MTS bounds of ATE21 suggest that a 10 percent increase in
expenditure on average raises the test score by 0.615 percent at the largest.
The bootstrap con¯dence interval for the MIV+MTR+MTS bounds implies that the LB of
ATE21 also fails to be strictly greater than zero at the 10 percent signi¯cance level; the UB
estimate and its 95 percentile of ATE21 rule out strong e®ects of private tutoring. Therefore,
it is also the case for ATE21 that there do not exist strong positive causal impacts of private
14tutoring on student academic performance.
Finally, as for an ATE E[y(2)¡y(0)] (`ATE20'), the primary results and patterns of changes
in bounds with varying assumptions are largely similar to the previous two cases. The joint
MIV+MTR+MTS bounds of ATE20 remain between 0 SD and 0.518 SD. From Table 6, they
suggest that a 10 percent increase in expenditure raises the test score by at most 0.764 per-
cent. The bootstrap con¯dence interval implies that the LB of ATE20 also fails to be strictly
greater than zero; the UB again rules out substantial e®ects of private tutoring. Namely, there
do not seem to exist strong positive causal impacts of private tutoring on student academic
performance. Such results largely reiterate the ¯ndings of Kang (2007) based on 2SLS methods.
As discussed in Kang (2007, p.19), our estimated e®ect of private tutoring expenditures
seems fairly comparable to the estimated e®ects of public school expenditures on earnings.
Betts (1995) suggests that a 10 percent reduction in the average teacher-pupil ratio leads to
a 0.4 percent increase in earnings. Grogger (1996) shows that a 10 percent increase in mean
spending per student leads to a 0.7 percent increase in wages. In terms of earnings in the labor
market, however, Card and Krueger (1996, p.37) report slightly greater e®ects of public school
spending; they summarize that a 10 percent increase in spending leads to about a 1-2 percent
increase in subsequent earnings. The estimates of the previous studies seem to be within the
bounds of the e®ect of private tutoring obtained by our bouding method.
4.3 Disaggregated Results of the Bounds Analysis
Until now, our bounding analysis does not address heterogeneity in ATE, focusing exclusively on
the whole sample and assuming that the e®ect of private tutoring is homogeneous for the entire
population. In contrast, previous research suggests that the e®ects of educational resources may
vary according to sex, race and the ability level of the student (Bedard 2003, Krueger 1999,
Rivkin et al. 2005). Moreover, to the extent that one takes our 2SLS estimate seriously, the
estimated e®ect of private tutoring does not necessarily represent the ATE among students who
are randomly chosen in the population; it is valid only for those students whose private tutoring
expenditures are likely to be a®ected by birth order (Angrist et al. 1996). Given potential
implications of heterogeneous e®ects for the current ¯ndings, there is a need to explore whether
the causal e®ects of private tutoring vary by the characteristics of the student.
In order to address heterogeneity in ATE, we disaggregate the whole sample by the following
15two characteristics of the student: a student's ability that is measured by the level of pre-tutoring
quality, and sex. The bounding results of the subsamples are reported in Table 4 for di®erent-
ability students, and in Table 5 for male and female students.
4.3.1 Disaggregation by Student Ability
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE.
Let us ¯rst examine the results for low-ability students whose pre-tutoring quality is below
the 50th percentile. The joint assumption bounds of ATEs are shown in Panel A of Table 4 for
this group of students. Patterns of changes in bounds with varying assumptions are similar to
those of previous cases. The tightest MIV+MTR+MTS bounds of ATE10 show that the true
magnitude of the e®ect of private tutoring is somewhere between 0 SD and 0.322 SD for low-
ability students, while the expenditure (Si) on average increases from 0 to 189.4. From Table 6,
the UB of ATE10 suggests that a 10 percent increase in expenditure on average raises the test
score by at most 0.532 percent. The bootstrap con¯dence interval for the MIV+MTR+MTS
bounds of ATE10 implies that the LB fails to be strictly greater than zero; the UB does not
reveal substantial e®ects of private tutoring. Thus, there do not seem to exist strong positive
causal impacts of private tutoring on academic performance of low-ability students.
The primary results for the bounds of ATE21 and ATE20 are largely similar to those of
ATE10, although the UB of ATE21 is slightly smaller and that of ATE20 is slightly greater
than the UB of ATE10. From Table 6, the MIV+MTR+MTS upper bound of ATE21 suggests
that a 10 percent increase in expenditure raises the test score by at most 0.451 percent; that
of ATE20 implies that a 10 percent increase in expenditure increases the test score by 0.672
percent at the largest. The LBs of both bounds fail to be strictly greater than zero; the UBs
do not present strong e®ects of the expenditure. Again, there exist negligible causal impacts of
private tutoring on low-ability students.
Examining the bounding results for high-ability students whose pre-tutoring quality is above
the 50th percentile in Panel B of Table 4, we ¯nd little evidence for heterogeneity of the e®ect
of private tutoring across di®erent-ability students. The main results for the bounds of ATE10,
ATE21 and ATE20 are largely similar to the counterpart of each ATE for low-ability students,
although the UBs of ATEs are slightly greater for high-ability students. For high-ability stu-
16dents, the MIV+MTR+MTS upper bound of ATE10 suggests at most a 0.596 percent increase
in test score due to a 10 percent increase in expenditure. The MIV+MTR+MTS upper bound
of ATE21 reveals at most a 0.580 percent increase in test score, and that of ATE20 shows at
most a 0.813 percent increase in test score due to a 10 percent increase in expenditure.
The bootstrap con¯dence intervals for the MIV+MTR+MTS bounds imply that each LB of
the bounds for ATE10, ATE21 and ATE20 fails to be strictly greater than zero; each UB does
not show substantial e®ects of the expenditure. Namely, there are negligible causal impacts of
private tutoring on academic performance of high-ability students as is the case of low-ability
students.
4.3.2 Disaggregation by Sex
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE.
In addition to disaggregation by student ability, we divide the whole sample by sex of the
student. As for male students, the tightest MIV+MTR+MTS bounds of ATE10 in Panel A of
Table 5 show that the true magnitude of the e®ect of private tutoring is somewhere between
0 SD and 0.308 SD, while the expenditure (Si) on average increases from 0 to 188.7. From
Table 6, the UB of ATE10 suggests at most a 0.476 percent increase in test score due to a 10
percent increase in expenditure. The bootstrap con¯dence interval implies that the LB fails to
be strictly greater than zero; the UB does not reveal strong e®ects of private tutoring.
The primary results for the bounds of ATE21 and ATE20 are largely similar to those of
ATE10. From Table 6, the MIV+MTR+MTS upper bound of ATE21 (ATE20) suggests that
a 10 percent increase in expenditure raises the test score by at most 0.582 (0.695) percent.
Examining the bounding results for female students, we ¯nd little evidence for heterogeneity
of the e®ect of private tutoring across male and female students. The main results for the
bounds of ATE10, ATE21 and ATE20 are largely similar to the counterpart of each ATE for
male students. For female students, the MIV+MTR+MTS upper bound of ATE10 suggests at
most a 0.445 percent increase in test score due to a 10 percent increase in expenditure. The
MIV+MTR+MTS upper bound of ATE21 (ATE20) reveals a 0.661 (0.711) percent increase in
test score due to a 10 percent increase in expenditure. There do not exist strong positive causal
impacts of private tutoring on female students and male students alike.
175 Concluding Remarks
In order to shed light on the e®ectiveness of educational investments for student outcomes, this
paper examines an unexplored dimension of educational inputs|private tutoring expenditures
of South Korean parents. In the face of di±culties in causal estimation, the paper employs
a nonparametric bounding method. With the method we show that the true e®ect of private
tutoring remains at most modest. Such a modest e®ect remains similar across male and female
students, and across students of di®erent ability levels.
To the extent that such a ¯nding may be contrary to expectations of many, we conclude
the paper by o®ering two potential explanations for the modest e®ect of private tutoring. Kang
(2007) presents more detail discussions about them.
First, overall quality of teachers in the private-tutoring sector may be responsible for small
e®ects of private expenditures. In Korea, full-time public school teachers are tenured up to
62 years of age and enjoy the same employment bene¯ts as government o±cials. In contrast,
contracts of instructors in private tutoring institutions are usually short-term in nature and
fairly unstable as in other private small ¯rms. This will cause teachers' quality in the private-
tutoring sector to be worse than that in the public sector. To the extent that teachers' quality
can make di®erences in student outcomes, private tutoring may have small e®ects.
Second, peer pressure among parents may explain the lack of the e®ect. When private
tutoring is a norm, the decision to invest in children's tutoring may not be based on an objective
cost-bene¯t analysis; they may be based on a subjective/cultural belief about the e®ectiveness of
private tutoring, or the concern about their being viewed by the peers as neglectful of children's
education. If the decision about tutoring is based on peer pressure, small e®ects of private
tutoring will not be a big surprise.
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24Table 2: OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the E®ect of Tutoring Expenditures on Performance: Birth
Order as an IV
Estimation method: OLS 2SLS
Dependent variable: Normalized Tutoring Normalized
test score Expenditure test score
(1) (2) (3)
Tutoring Expenditure 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0017 (0.0011)
[0.060] [0.762]
First-born child 47.62 (17.67)**
Hours of self-study 0.015 (0.002)** 0.668 (0.772) 0.014 (0.002)**
Prior quality (Q2) 0.619 (0.070)** 41.88 (29.67) 0.545 (0.099)**
Prior quality (Q3) 0.925 (0.071)** -0.270 (27.43) 0.917 (0.080)**
Prior quality (Q4) 1.466 (0.075)** 4.814 (29.88) 1.454 (0.087)**
Prior quality missing 0.824 (0.072)** -59.49 (25.40)* 0.910 (0.103)**
Single father -0.276 (0.107)** -24.83 (38.58) -0.247 (0.131)
Single mother 0.050 (0.099) -4.558 (23.79) 0.063 (0.098)
Books at home 0.000 (0.000) 0.070 (0.043) 0.000 (0.000)
Family income 0.000 (0.000) 0.646 (0.076)** -0.001 (0.001)
Parents' avg edu 0.049 (0.010)** 14.17 (3.523)** 0.026 (0.020)
Parents' avg age 0.002 (0.007) 6.392 (2.502)* -0.004 (0.008)
Age -0.108 (0.039)** 5.369 (15.71) -0.119 (0.047)*
Male -0.004 (0.064) -12.86 (21.64) 0.021 (0.074)
Only child -0.117 (0.093) 2.398 (38.34) -0.152 (0.108)
Sibship size -0.002 (0.039) -33.67 (12.05)** 0.056 (0.058)
Intercept -0.228 (0.753) -507.9 (293.8) 0.362 (0.997)





F (IVs excluded from 7.26
the 2nd stage)
R-square 0.373 0.270 0.155
Number of sample 1,467 1,467 1,467
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * and ** indicate that the estimate
is signi¯cant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. The numbers in square brackets
are percent changes in test score due to a 10 percent change in expenditure.
25Table 3: Bounds of E[y(t)] and Average Treatment E®ects for the Whole Sample
Assumptions: Worst-case (WC) Monotone treatment response (MTR)
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(0)] -2.440 2.354 -2.498 2.417 -2.440 0.089 -2.489 0.132
E[y(1)] -1.486 1.553 -1.559 1.622 -0.926 0.736 -0.996 0.791
E[y(2)] -1.985 2.183 -2.054 2.241 0.089 2.183 0.047 2.237
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] -3.840 3.993 -3.913 4.059 0.000 3.176 0.000 3.217
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] -3.537 3.669 -3.608 3.736 0.000 3.109 0.000 3.151
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] -4.338 4.623 -4.412 4.692 0.000 4.623 0.000 4.688
Assumptions: Monotone treatment selection (MTS) Monotone IV (MIV)
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(0)] -0.214 2.354 -0.305 2.415 -2.270 2.354 -2.362 2.414
E[y(1)] -0.549 0.963 -0.621 1.039 -1.486 1.519 -1.558 1.604
E[y(2)] -1.985 0.325 -2.059 0.395 -1.985 2.106 -2.057 2.191
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] -2.903 1.177 -2.950 1.300 -3.840 3.788 -3.917 3.914
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] -2.948 0.874 -2.990 0.971 -3.503 3.592 -3.581 3.676
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] -4.338 0.539 -4.422 0.656 -4.338 4.376 -4.411 4.502
Assumptions: MIV+MTR MIV+MTS
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(0)] -2.270 0.089 -2.349 0.130 -0.202 2.354 -0.310 2.414
E[y(1)] -0.850 0.625 -0.943 0.707 -0.548 0.960 -0.619 1.030
E[y(2)] 0.089 2.106 0.049 2.193 -1.985 0.316 -2.053 0.389
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 2.895 0.000 3.002 -2.902 1.162 -2.954 1.288
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 2.957 0.000 3.084 -2.944 0.864 -2.994 0.961
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 4.376 0.000 4.488 -4.338 0.518 -4.413 0.641
Assumptions: MTR+MTS MIV+MTR+MTS
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(0)] -0.214 0.089 -0.318 0.130 -0.202 0.089 -0.300 0.131
E[y(1)] 0.011 0.146 -0.038 0.190 0.012 0.143 -0.036 0.188
E[y(2)] 0.089 0.325 0.049 0.391 0.089 0.316 0.048 0.391
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.360 0.000 0.474 0.000 0.345 0.000 0.450
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 0.314 0.000 0.395 0.000 0.304 0.000 0.392
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.539 0.000 0.661 0.000 0.518 0.000 0.643
26Table 4: Bounds of E[y(t)] and Average Treatment E®ects by Ability
Panel A: Low-ability students (N = 454)
Assumptions: MIV+MTR MIV+MTS
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(0)] -2.408 -0.402 -2.531 -0.336 -0.665 2.320 -0.858 2.441
E[y(1)] -1.219 0.113 -1.353 0.253 -0.868 0.697 -0.976 0.827
E[y(2)] -0.402 1.891 -0.467 2.053 -2.111 -0.248 -2.216 -0.123
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 2.521 0.000 2.711 -3.188 1.362 -3.267 1.603
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 3.109 0.000 3.307 -2.808 0.620 -2.876 0.777
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 4.299 0.000 4.493 -4.431 0.417 -4.562 0.635
Assumptions: MTR+MTS MIV+MTR+MTS
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(0)] -0.721 -0.402 -0.867 -0.336 -0.665 -0.402 -0.858 -0.336
E[y(1)] -0.452 -0.341 -0.527 -0.274 -0.452 -0.343 -0.532 -0.273
E[y(2)] -0.402 -0.235 -0.467 -0.105 -0.402 -0.248 -0.469 -0.131
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.535 0.000 0.322 0.000 0.518
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 0.217 0.000 0.369 0.000 0.204 0.000 0.337
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.486 0.000 0.689 0.000 0.417 0.000 0.636
Panel B: High-ability students (N = 633)
Assumptions: MIV+MTR MIV+MTS
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(0)] -2.374 0.475 -2.502 0.532 0.118 2.531 -0.074 2.608
E[y(1)] -0.589 0.916 -0.762 1.009 -0.103 1.284 -0.213 1.389
E[y(2)] 0.475 2.143 0.417 2.253 -1.783 0.702 -1.912 0.789
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 3.290 0.000 3.443 -2.634 1.166 -2.707 1.389
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 2.732 0.000 2.937 -3.067 0.805 -3.136 0.946
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 4.517 0.000 4.686 -4.313 0.584 -4.436 0.800
Assumptions: MTR+MTS MIV+MTR+MTS
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(0)] 0.089 0.475 -0.076 0.532 0.118 0.475 -0.089 0.534
E[y(1)] 0.390 0.533 0.320 0.590 0.395 0.530 0.321 0.591
E[y(2)] 0.475 0.705 0.418 0.788 0.475 0.702 0.414 0.795
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.444 0.000 0.618 0.000 0.412 0.000 0.624
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 0.315 0.000 0.426 0.000 0.307 0.000 0.425
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.617 0.000 0.792 0.000 0.584 0.000 0.801
27Table 5: Bounds of E[y(t)] and Average Treatment E®ects by Sex
Panel A: Male students (N = 835)
Assumptions: MIV+MTR MIV+MTS
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(0)] -2.286 0.038 -2.393 0.097 -0.216 2.318 -0.369 2.416
E[y(1)] -0.913 0.612 -1.035 0.727 -0.609 0.936 -0.723 1.036
E[y(2)] 0.038 2.072 -0.022 2.192 -1.998 0.250 -2.088 0.350
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 2.898 0.000 3.052 -2.927 1.152 -2.999 1.326
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 2.985 0.000 3.149 -2.934 0.859 -3.000 1.013
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 4.358 0.000 4.517 -4.316 0.466 -4.424 0.635
Assumptions: MTR+MTS MIV+MTR+MTS
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(0)] -0.253 0.038 -0.393 0.099 -0.216 0.038 -0.345 0.099
E[y(1)] -0.034 0.095 -0.107 0.162 -0.033 0.092 -0.105 0.159
E[y(2)] 0.038 0.257 -0.024 0.362 0.038 0.250 -0.024 0.352
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.348 0.000 0.501 0.000 0.308 0.000 0.451
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 0.291 0.000 0.418 0.000 0.283 0.000 0.404
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.688 0.000 0.466 0.000 0.627
Panel B: Female students (N = 632)
Assumptions: MIV+MTR MIV+MTS
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(0)] -2.248 0.158 -2.370 0.220 -0.084 2.401 -0.262 2.479
E[y(1)] -0.767 0.642 -0.910 0.750 -0.469 0.990 -0.566 1.092
E[y(2)] 0.158 2.151 0.098 2.260 -1.968 0.405 -2.072 0.510
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 2.890 0.000 3.060 -2.870 1.074 -2.933 1.272
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 2.918 0.000 3.100 -2.957 0.874 -3.014 1.014
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 4.400 0.000 4.570 -4.368 0.489 -4.477 0.694
Assumptions: MTR+MTS MIV+MTR+MTS
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(0)] -0.157 0.158 -0.278 0.217 -0.084 0.158 -0.243 0.222
E[y(1)] 0.070 0.211 0.000 0.275 0.070 0.209 -0.003 0.278
E[y(2)] 0.158 0.416 0.100 0.518 0.158 0.405 0.094 0.512
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.369 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.293 0.000 0.465
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 0.346 0.000 0.468 0.000 0.335 0.000 0.454
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.573 0.000 0.726 0.000 0.489 0.000 0.667
28Table 6: Bounds of the Percentage Increase in Test Score due to a 10 Percent Increase in
Expenditure
Panel A: Whole sample
LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.529 0.000 0.690
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 0.615 0.000 0.792
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.764 0.000 0.948
Panel B: Subsamples by ability
Low-ability High-ability
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.532 0.000 0.858 0.000 0.596 0.000 0.902
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 0.451 0.000 0.746 0.000 0.580 0.000 0.802
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.672 0.000 1.024 0.000 0.813 0.000 1.116
Panel C: Subsamples by sex
Male Female
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
5 pctile 95 pctile 5 pctile 95 pctile
E[y(1) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.476 0.000 0.697 0.000 0.445 0.000 0.707
E[y(2) ¡ y(1)] 0.000 0.582 0.000 0.832 0.000 0.661 0.000 0.898
E[y(2) ¡ y(0)] 0.000 0.695 0.000 0.934 0.000 0.711 0.000 0.969
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